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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PINNACLE HIGHLANDS, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
MITCH TOMLINSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20030386-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
MITCH TOMLINSON 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Whether the District Court, erred in failing to allow Defendant/Appellee to 
call witnesses to suppori IIIM position at the hearing. 
2. Whether the District Cour -^v . "•- - ;ig that I.I valid stipulation existed 
between the parties. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in that there was no factiu h^i - ^ -: • \. 
judgement entered in the amount of one thousand three hundred thirty two 
dollars and fifty-two cents. 
4. Whether the District Court erred in failing, k> make specific findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in support of its judgement. 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review for issue number one of determining whether tl'.;\*v is 
a reasonable I , • , • :• e^ verdict mi^ht have been different had the witnesses 
been allowed io testify, vvm ; . — h • ' ,i \";\..-. of the aggrieved party. 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah App. i^9oj. 
The standard of review for issues number two and ihn v is \\\. -\ Variy 
erroneous" standard established by I Jtali Rules of Civii Procedure 52(a). TRF v. 
i eian -' ' LJI App. 1998V Rule 52(a) requires "that if the 
7 
findings... are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the 
findings will be set aside." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
The standard of review for issue number 4 is that involving questions of law. 
Under such standard of review, this Court in reviewing questions of law, accords 
no particular deference to the trial court's conclusions but review them for 
correctness. Zions First National Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 652 
(Utah 1998), Ketchum, Konkel v. Heritage Mt. 784 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1989), 
Case Roofing v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, (Utah 1989), State v. Viiil 784 P.2d 
1130 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative in this appeal: 
Jurisdiction of district courts, Utah Code Ann. 78-33-1 (1996) (Form-Effect): 
Court's General Powers, Utah Code Ann. 78-33-5 (1996) 
Rules 52, 44, 43, and 61 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
75 American Jurisprudence 2d. Trial, Section 145, Order of Proof. 
Date of entry of judgement or order appealed from 
March 28, 2003. 
Nature of Post Judgments Motion(s) and date(s) filed 
8 
No post judgment motions were filed. 
Date and effect of order(s) disposing of post judgement motion(s) and order of 
determination of final judgment under Utah R. Civ, P. 54(b) 
No post judgement motions were filed. 
Date of filing notice of appeal 
April 18, 2003 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-
2(3)0) U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment and order of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Michael K. Burton presiding 
entering judgment against Defendant in the amount of one thousand three hundred 
thirty two dollars and fifty-two cents ($1,332.52). 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS MATERIAL TO THE 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
On or about April 4, 2002, Plaintiff, Appellee, filed a Complaint against 
Defendant. On April 8, 2002, Defendant, Appellant, filed a Counterclaim, 
previously identified as a "Cross-complaint". On or about April 12, 2002, 
Plaintiff, Appellee filed a Motion For Summary Judgment and Request For Oral 
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Arguments, and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Notice of Hearing. Argument for Plaintiff, Appelle's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was subsequently scheduled for April 26, 2002. On April26, 2002, the 
parties are alleged to have reached a stipulation. 
The validity of such stipulation is at issue in this appeal. On or about May 
14, 2002, an alleged copy of the stipulation was filed with the trial court. On or 
about May 15, 2002, a Certification of Judgment was filed with the trial court by 
Plaintiff, against Defendant. On or about May 15, 2002, a Judgment and Order of 
Restitution against Defendant, Appellant, was submitted to the trial Court for 
signature. On or about May 23, 2002, judgment was entered against Defendant, 
Appellant, in the amount of $6,975.25. On or about July 10, 2002, Defendant, 
Appellant, files a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and a Motion to Set Aside 
Stipulation. 
On or about August 2, 2002, a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment was filed by Plaintiff. On or about August 14, 
2002, a Verified Motion for Extension of Time in Which to Respond to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum and Request Oral Arguments was filed. A hearing on the motion to 
set aside judgment was scheduled for October 11, 2002. On or about October 11, 
2002, the judgment entered on May 23, 2002 is set aside. On or about October 22, 
2002, Plaintiff, Appellee, files a Motion to Enforce Settlement and Request for 
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Hearing. An evidentiary hearing on the motion to enforce settlement was 
scheduled for March 28, 2003. On March 28, 2003, the parties appeared before the 
trial court for the evidentiary hearing. At such hearing, Judge Michael K. Burton 
inquires what the issues are. 
Cullimore waives the claim for treble damages and attorney fees. 
Judge Burton questions whether a stipulation has been reached. Judge 
Burton questions the defendant, Appellant. Defendant, Appellant has witnesses 
present in the courtroom. 
The manner in which Judge Burton conducts the evidentiary hearing does 
not allow for the calling of witnesses. Judge Burton receives no evidence to 
contradict Defendant's testimony concerning certain dollar amounts in damages or 
the reduction thereof. In regards to the cleaning deposit and key return. After 
questioning Defendant, Appellant, Judge Burton enters a judgment leaving no 
opportunity for further evidence. Judge Burton fails to elicit his findings of fact in 
support of the judgment entered. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT TO CALL WITNESSES TO SUPPORT HIS 
POSITION AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A VALID 
n 
STIPULATION EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE AMOUNT OF THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
IV. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT IN 
THE AMOUNT OF ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY 
TWO DOLLARS AND FIFTY-TWO CENTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT TO CALL WITNESSES TO SUPPORT HIS 
POSITION AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
By failing to allow either party to call witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, 
the trial court committed reversible error. Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
does provide that witnesses may be excluded from the courtroom. However, rule 
615 specifically states that it does not authorize the exclusion of "a person whose 
presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's 
cause." Similarly, rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "[a]ll 
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relevant evidence is of the United States or the Constitution of Utah, statute, or by 
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state." 
As a general rule, courts have found that reversible error occurs when a 
judge prevents a party from presenting evidence, which has the outcome of 
prejudicing or harming a party's case. For example, in the case of Clark v. Clark, 
716 N.E. P.2d 144, 152 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999), a Massachusetts court recognized 
that "[a] judge, as the guiding spirit and controlling mind of the trial, should be 
able to set reasonable limits on the length of a trial. This includes the right to set 
reasonable limits on the length of direct and cross-examination of witnesses. The 
limits, however, should not be such that a party is prevented from presenting its 
entire case to the fact finder." In the case of Kearney v. Kansas Public Service 
Co., 665 P.2d 757, 767 (Kan. 1983), the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized that 
the relevancy of testimony elicited from any witness and the scope of witness 
examination is subject to the reasonable control of the trial court, and exercise of 
reasonable control of the trial court, and exercise of reasonable control will not 
constitute reversible error absent a showing of abuse resulting in prejudice." 
(Quoting p. 261, 564 P.2d 482). The Wyoming Supreme Court in Seaton v. Wvo. 
Highway Com'n, Dist 1, 784 P.2d 197, 202 (Wyo, 1989) recognized that athe 
manner in which the examination of witnesses is conducted rests largely within the 
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discretion of the trial court. Before we reverse a verdict on such grounds, the trial 
court must have flagrantly abused its discretion." 
In Utah, a District Court's decision was reversed because the trial court 
erroneously excluded evidence offered by Defendants. The Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of Whitehead v. American Motor Sales Corporation, 801 P.2d 925 
(Utah 1990), found that exclusion of certain evidence was grounds for reversal 
where it affected the substantial rights of a party. In ruling on whether exclusion 
of a witness constituted reversible error, the Utah Court of Appeals found that the 
"exclusion of an expert witness does not automatically constitute reversible error." 
Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Utah App. 1998). Despite the foregoing, the 
court in Astill stated that, "to prove the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding an expert witness from the courtroom during trial, the appellant must 
show that he or she was harmed or prejudiced by the court's decision.". 
In the present case, Defendant was prejudiced when Judge Burton made a 
ruling without allowing Defendant to present his witnesses, which were in the 
courtroom and ready to testify. Defendant's witnesses did have information 
regarding the amount Defendant should have been charged for the cleaning 
deposit. More to the point, Defendant's witnesses were aware that Defendant had 
previously paid to have the carpets in his apartment cleaned. Among the damages 
awarded by Judge Burton were cost for cleaning the carpets in the apartment. 
14 
Clearly, the exclusion of Defendant's witnesses on this point was prejudicial and 
harmful to the Defendant. 
In addition to the forgoing, Defendant/Appellant was prejudiced by the order 
of the presentation of proof at the evidentiary hearing. The general rule for 
presentation or order of proof is stated in 75 Am. Jur. 2ed Trial, Section 145: 
While the trial court is invested with wide discretion in 
permitting departures from the usual order of proof when 
circumstances of the case require, the general rule is that the 
party who has the burden of proof is entitled to open the evidence; 
he should then introduce all his evidence in chief, and after his 
adversary has introduced all his evidence in chief, the former 
should be confined to rebuttal evidence. 
Under the facts of the present case, Judge Burton did not follow the normal 
order of presenting proof. In fact, Judge Burton controlled the entire presentation 
of proof. Had Judge Burton allowed the parties to conduct the March 28, 2003 
hearing in the normal manner, Defendant/Appellant would have been allowed to 
introduce witness testimony in regards to damages. 
In summary, there is little doubt that this case should be remanded. The 
mere fact that witnesses were not allowed to testify is prima facie evidence of 
abuse of discretion, which resulted in prejudice. Further, the fact that Judge 
Burton flagrantly deviated from the order of proof by not allowing the parties to 
call witnesses is prejudicial error. While it is recognized that a judge has certain 
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control over presentation of witnesses and evidence, the absolute denial of the 
opportunity to present certain evidence is not reasonable. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A VALID 
STIPULATION EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
The standard of review for issues involving findings of the trier of fact is the 
"clearly erroneous" standard established by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
TRF v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 908 (Utah App. 1988). Rule 52(a) requires "that if 
the findings.... Are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made, the findings will be set aside." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). 
Under the specific fact of the current case it is clearly erroneous to have 
found that a valid contract or stipulation existed for the following reasons: The 
Plaintiff broke the agreement by proceeding to get a judgement when the 
stipulation had not been violated. Furthermore, the formula and the dollar amount 
in paragraph 2 of the stipulation (SETTLEMENT TERMS) do not agree. The 
Plaintiff never claimed that the defendant was behind on rent. Therefore, using the 
formula: (based upon $112.52 Previous balance, April R, May R through 5/10/02) 
$112.52 Previous balance, $1085.00 for Aprils rent, plus $350.00 for Mays rent to 
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the tenth. This would equal $1547.52, not $2312 52. This does not account for the 
deposit owed to the defendant for $1085.00. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE AMOUNT OF THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
Trial Courts are obligated to enter findings of fact in support of any 
judgment. Therefore, it is clear error for a trial court rot to make findings of fact, 
which would demonstrate the validity of a judgment. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure states in relevant part that: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without jury or with an advisory 
jury the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant 
to Rule 52(a); in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the 
court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of Fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the finding of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
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and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
In support of the provisions of Rule 52(a), the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that the court has a duty to make findings on all material issues. See; 
LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 420 P.2d 615 (1966). In addition to the 
foregoing, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded a divorce case for inadequate 
findings on the issues of alimony, and fees, where no findings had been made 
regarding the wife's financial condition and needs. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 
73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho Court of Appeals in the case of Wood v. 
Wood, 855 P.2d 473 (Idaho App. 1993), found that a trial court must make 
findings and the Court of Appeals could not disregard the trial court's failure to 
make findings of fact unless the answers were obvious in light of a clear record. 
As stated herein, failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
involves a question of law. Therefore, this Court accords no particular deference 
to the trial court's conclusions but reviews them for correctness. Zions First 
National Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 1988), Ketchum, 
Konkel v. Heritage MU 784 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1989), and Case Roofing v. 
Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
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At the evidentiary hearing held on March 28, 2003, Judge Burton made the 
Following assessments in support of the judgment: (refer to transcript) 
Despite the foregoing Judge Burton did not set forth specifically the grounds 
upon which he based the judgment. More particularly he did not address the 
contention Defendant had made in regards to the cleaning fees charged and the 
fifty dollar key deposit. Accordingly, there were insufficient findings of fact made 
by Judge Burton. Failure to make particular findings of fact leaves the trial court's 
record incomplete. Without specific findings of fact it is difficult to determine the 
basis that supports the judgment of the method used to arrive at a judgment 
amount. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered in this case must be set 
aside. 
IV. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURTS JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT/APPELLANT IN THE 
AMOUNT OF ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY 
TWO DOLLARS AND FIFTY-TWO CENTS. 
The judgement entered against Defendant/Appellant on March 28, 2003 was 
not supported by the evidence provided to the District Court and must therefore be 
set aside, The legal standard for challenging sufficiency of evidence to support a 
finding has been set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Child v. 
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 (1998). In Child, the court recognized that a party 
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challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support finding must state fully and 
accurately all of the evidence on the issue and then show, as a matter of law, that 
the evidence does not support the verdict. In State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-
739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals found that when challenging 
a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the evidence supporting that verdict 
and then demonstrate that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this court should set aside the stipulation and remand this case 
to the District court for re-trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
 {CK day of ^—^Jbs? *^ , 2004 2-
Mitch Torrffinson, Pro Se 
<^< asia o i^W.. 
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